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Introduction: How EMU was achieved
F
or the EU, the integration of the candidate
countries into the Union will be the most
important challenge for the foreseeable future. It
will have a major impact on the Union's institu-
tions and policies. It will also have implications for
the continued process of economic integration –
including euro-area membership.
It should be recalled that the creation of EMU fol-
lowed a long period of economic integration.Trade
integration has intensified progressively since the
earliest years, fostering greater competition and
efficiency in the Member State economies. From
moderate beginnings as a customs union of six
Member States, the EU has graduated to a unified
internal market for most goods and services com-
prising 15 Member States and a population of
more than 350 million.
The process of monetary integration, an objective
of the Community from at least December 1969,
has been less smooth. Serious setbacks were expe-
rienced along the way to the launch of the euro. In
the 1970s, asymmetric policy responses to the oil
price shocks undermined European efforts to
maintain stable exchange rates following the
breakdown of the Bretton-Woods framework. In
the 1980s, capital-market liberalisation within the
Union exposed the Member States to the now
well-known "inconsistent trinity" of fixed-but-
adjustable exchange rates, independent monetary
policy and liberalised capital movements.As finan-
cial-market discipline on economic policymaking
gained in importance, the failure to correct policy
inconsistencies within and among the Member
States culminated in the ERM crises of 1992/93. In
spite of – and in many ways because of – this neg-
ative experience, the process of European mone-
tary integration scheduled in Maastricht in 1991,
continued and was completed with the introduc-
tion of the euro on the 1 January 1999.
All in all, EMU and the euro reflect 40 years of
economic and monetary integration.The degree of
integration already achieved made it possible for
policymakers to focus primarily on the fulfilment
of nominal – rather than real – convergence crite-
ria as necessary conditions for participation in a
monetary union.
The experience of EMU should be a guide to man-
aging the integration process of the accession
countries. Thus the question arises whether inte-
gration into the Union – and particularly the euro
area – can be compressed without resulting in
severe economic difficulties jeopardising the bene-
fits of integration. Anyway, it is generally agreed
that each country must follow its own path towards
full integration. This path will be determined by
historical experiences and current achievements.
Accession countries: What kind of exchange rate
regime?
The debate of the appropriate exchange rate
regime for developing countries appears to be
never-ending.1 Recently, the advocates of corner
solutions – either completely flexible exchange
rates or the “euroisation from the Atlantic to the
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tance. But at the same time, others argue that each
country should consider its specificities when it
chooses its exchange rate system, taking into
account its size, state of development, initial condi-
tions of integration and the choices it has made as
regards internal and external liberalisation of cap-
ital movements. It appears difficult to reconcile
both views.
The exchange rate is an important macro-econom-
ic variable and policy instrument. Apart from the
two important prices for production factors, i.e. the
(real) interest rate as the price of capital and the
(real) wage level as the price of labour, the
exchange rate reflects the relative productivity
(profitability) between economies. Obviously, the
more diverse the adjustment paths of different
economies are and the more closely their (trad-
able) products compete with each other, the
greater the need for price flexibility. It appears
that, as long as accession countries’ characteristics
are very different from those prevailing in the EU
and given that integration into the single market is
proceeding rapidly, there is an a priori case for
flexibility in all of the three policy instruments
(prices) in order to let markets do their work.
In the case of liberalised capital movements, the
choice of the exchange-rate regime predetermines
whether there is a degree of freedom for other
policies,in particular monetary policy.Credibly fix-
ing the exchange rate removes the freedom to con-
duct independent monetary policy as the level of
interest rates is determined by external needs, i.e.,
it is determined as well. Therefore, much more of
the burden of adjustment is put on the remaining
“price”, the level of wages. In addition, other poli-
cy instruments may be considered for dealing with
possible adjustment needs. But fiscal and structur-
al policies usually have different objectives, in par-
ticular, in catching-up countries. Using them, may
give rise to a sub-optimal policy assignment.
Exchange rate and interest rate developments are
determinants of the stance of monetary policy.
Should there be a need for tighter monetary condi-
tions, – e.g. due to overheating or strong capital
inflows – then the real exchange rate should be
above equilibrium, while the real interest rate
should be relatively high. However, if a country
with fixed exchange rates were to require tight
monetary conditions, this could only be achieved
by a real appreciation induced by higher inflation
or by deflation, which would raise the real interest
rate. Obviously, the former would imply a more
expansionary interest-rate impact as the real inter-
est rate would decline in view of accelerating infla-
tion while the latter would improve cost competi-
tiveness. The dynamics of such distorted monetary
conditions could have long lasting structural impli-
cations (see below).As the financial markets of the
accession countries are still at an early stage of
development, the importance of inappropriate
monetary conditions during the integration
process might be underestimated for the time
being.
Monetary implications of the Balassa-Samuelson
effect
We assume that a candidate country has credibly
fixed its exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro.The coun-
try concerned is in a situation where productivity
growth in the exposed sector is high, while wage
pressures lead to high inflation in the sheltered ser-
vices sector.Therefore, relatively high inflation, i.e.
rates above those in the euro area should not affect
competitiveness (Balassa-Samuelson (BS) effect).3
However, the real short-term interest rate would
be low as the country would be importing the rela-
tively low level of short-term nominal interest
rates of the euro area, so monetary conditions as
for instance measured by a monetary conditions
index (MCI)4 would be too expansionary. Without
any compensating measures, the MCI would only
become neutral if the currency were to appreciate
to above its equilibrium level. If, for example, the
BS-effect implies an inflation rate exceeding that
of the area to which the exchange rate is fixed by
2 percentage points and the ratio of weights in the
MCI between the real interest rate and the real
effective exchange rate is 1:3, then the real effec-
tive exchange rate has to appreciate by 6% for the
MCI to return to a neutral level. If the adjustment
period were three years, then the inflation rate
would be 4% above the euro area (see Box 1).
3 See Balassa (1964), Samuelson (1964). Recently empirical evi-
dence has been presented indicating significant inflation differen-
tials vis-à-vis the euro area,e.g.Sinn and Reutter (2001),Björnstén
(2000), Pelkmans, Gross and Nuñes Ferrer (2000). Some authors
have interpreted these results as indicating inconsistency between
the Maastricht criteria and catching-up (e.g. Szapéry 2000).
4The MCI is a weighted average of the real short-term interest rate
and the real effective exchange rate. It is used here as an illustra-
tion of the stance of monetary policy, but not as an intermediate
target for monetary policy.During the adjustment, the MCI would of course
become even more distorted as the level of real
interest rates is further reduced. Therefore, while
monetary conditions would be characterised in the
long term by too expansionary interest rates and too
tight exchange rate components during the adjust-
ment period after the credible fix, monetary condi-
tions would necessarily become too accommodative.
Even if a neutral stance of monetary conditions were
to be achieved quickly, the long-run implications of
expansionary interest rates and low competitiveness
in terms of external sustainability are unclear.
Real catching-up in an integrated financial market
The BS-effect reflects a steady, medium-term
adjustment path. In contrast, real catching-up could
be a very dynamic process.This is especially true for
an economy that successfully integrates with a high-
income economy. Real catching-up begins with cre-
ating the conditions for a high expected real rate of
return for fixed investment. This attracts foreign
direct investment, probably exceeding the absorp-
tion capacity of the country’s potential. Domestic
demand will be stimulated by high income expecta-
tions.Thus the private sector savings ratio might be
low. Fiscal policy, if it wants to support the catching-
up process, should provide adequate infrastructure
investment and may accelerate structural reform in
order to shift labour from unproductive jobs to new
ones. In this scenario, demand will outstrip supply
and the currency would have to appreciate in real
terms. If the exchange rate were fixed, this would
happen through higher inflation. Higher inflation
would set in motion a wage-price spiral and the
country’s competitiveness would be eroded, with
real appreciation overshooting the real equilibrium
exchange rate.
In this initial phase of catching-up, there is nothing
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It would stabilise domestic demand relative to sup-
ply through a current account deficit. As an aside,
it would render imported (investment) goods
cheaper. It is also a normal compensation for the
estimated initial under-valuation at the beginning
of the transition and the set-up of the pegs that
have been used to achieve the initial “gross” disin-
flation at the beginning of the 1990s.
A successful catching-up process is in principle
facilitated by the liberalisation of financial mar-
kets. Financing productive investment is not con-
strained, and private households could consume
ahead of higher income thus inter-temporally opti-
mising consumption. However, the combination of
free capital movements and a credibly fixed
exchange rate will almost inevitably expose the
integrating country to asset market bubbles.There
is no reason to think that the candidate countries
will be immune to the pitfalls experienced in the
context of the Nordic banking crisis of the 1990s.
While the expected real rate of return will be high at
the initial stage of catching-up, high inflation, the
perceived absence of an exchange-rate risk, and low
nominal interest rates will imply that many (too
many) investment projects will be considered prof-
itable. Investment will spill over to sectors which are
prone to bubble dynamics such as equity markets
and the real estate sector, notwithstanding improve-
ments in the supervisory framework for the financial
sector.The implied mis-selection of investment pro-
jects according to a risk-return evaluation, which
does not include the impact of the real exchange rate
appreciation on the real rate of return, will further
accelerate overheating, fuelling inflation and real
appreciation further. With hindsight, investments
would prove less profitable than expected at the
time they were planned.As the exchange rate cannot
depreciate in nominal terms, subsequent deflation
would further contribute to an actual rate of return
which is below the previously expected one.
Therefore, the dynamics of successful catching-up
would add to pressure on the real exchange rate
and thus distort the MCI even more. In addition, a
wage-price spiral might then imply an overshoot-
ing of the real exchange rate. E.g., a loss of com-
petitiveness relative to the equilibrium exchange
rate of 20% has been witnessed in previous cases,
i.e. in Portugal and Spain. Both countries were
forced to devalue by such magnitudes in the early
1990s (see Box 2).
There appear to be limited options to counteract
such detrimental developments. One option would
be to adhere to capital controls. This, however,
would postpone the catching-up process as capital
shortages would emerge. Indeed, domestic savings
would remain low and the public sector would not
be in a position to run large surpluses. Moreover,
liberalised capital markets are a sine qua non of
full participation in the single market and are part
of the “acquis communautaire”.
Another option would be to use fiscal policy to
absorb excess demand. However, given the poten-
tial for excess demand, the magnitude of fiscal
retrenchment would be huge and would undoubt-
edly interfere with the genuine task of providing
public goods to society. Moreover, as fiscal policy
would no longer be able to accompany the private
sector-led catching-up process, it would retard it.
The experience of the Member States actually
shows that fiscal retrenchment tends to increase
the volatility of capital spending – and thereby its
effectiveness – unless it forms part of a credible
medium-term fiscal framework (cf.UK code on fis-
cal stability). It would then have similar effects as
capital controls as it would make the country a less
attractive place to invest. For these reasons, it
appears that a sequenced approach to integration
is the most preferable one.
A sequenced approach to integration
The envisaged enlargement of the EU will bring
small open economies into the Union that are in a
process of catching-up with the EU. While deci-
sions about the separate stages of accession (acces-
sion to the EU, ERM-2 membership/integration,
entry into Stage III) have still to be made, the
process of transition is already going on. Thus, the
subsequent remarks refer mainly to the transition
process or economic integration without prejudic-
ing/commenting on the accession stages. The first
phase of integration should be to concentrate on
establishing an economy firmly based on market
principles.This phase will be characterised by poli-
cies to ensure macroeconomic stabilisation and
structural transformation. In this context, institu-
tional reform is essential and should include wide
ranging privatisation programmes and the estab-
lishment of legal certainty, i.e. contract rights.
Labour market reform should focus primarily on
improving investment in human capital so as toprovide for growth in labour productivity.
Budgetary reform should involve a scaling down of
intervention in the economy, while establishing an
efficient tax and social security system. Financial
reforms should be aimed at creating an efficient
banking sector to ensure an effective intermedia-
tion of savings and a smooth transmission of mon-
etary policy.
In this initial phase, the exchange rate is a fairly
unimportant factor in the overall policy regime.
This is because of a low degree of international
integration, as regards both trade and financial
flows. During this phase, most countries tend to
adopt administered exchange-rate regimes,ranging
from currency boards to fixed pegs.
Most of the accession countries have made consid-
erable progress in creating a market-based econo-
my.6 These countries could already be said to be in
a second phase of integration. In this phase, struc-
tural reform remains high on the agenda but is of a
CESifo Forum 10
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during ERM 2 and
postponing adoption
of the euro
more advanced nature. For example, this phase is
characterised by reform of the agricultural sector,
the dismantling of conglomerates in heavy indus-
try, the fostering of SMEs and the development of
service industries.The objective of these reforms is
to prepare the economy to cope with the competi-
tive environment of the EU's single market.
Financial reform will also be important in this
phase, so as to prepare the domestic financial sec-
tor for the challenges posed by the liberalisation of
capital movements. Indeed, it is not surprising that
the accession countries that have made most
progress in financial sector reform have the highest
per capita investment ratio.
In the third phase of integration, the accession coun-
tries would be with a derogation for stage III of
EMU and perhaps with other transitional arrange-
ments with respect to some elements of the “acquis
communautaire”. Economic policy would remain
supply-side oriented but the authorities might be
considering the need for an exit strategy from admin-
istered exchange rates. Why? Because it is in this
phase that difficulties will emerge in conducting poli-
cies that are aimed simultaneously at nominal and
real convergence,and that have to be used respecting
that exchange rate policy is a matter of common con-
cern.Given that the accession countries will be catch-
ing up – hopefully at a rapid speed – it may not be
possible to target price stability, sound public
finances and exchange rate stability at the same time.
In sum, we are again confronted with the inconsis-
tent trinity of liberalised capital movements,sover-
eign monetary policies and fixed exchange rates.
Given the need for catching up in the accession
countries, this inconsistency would seem to be
resolved most effectively by surrendering the fixed
exchange rate. ERM 2 could provide the frame-
work for managing a flexible exchange rate, allow-
ing for successful catching-up while maintaining a
clear orientation toward nominal convergence –
and the ultimate adoption of the euro.
A further trade-off may exist between successful
catching-up and achieving the budgetary discipline
implied by the Maastricht criteria. Catching up can
be sustained only if there is an adequate public
infrastructure. Provision of this infrastructure may
require high rates of public investment.As the rate
of return on this public investment would be high,
deficit financing would seem justified. In these cir-
cumstances,a budget deficit above 3% and certain-
ly above the "close to balance" rule of the Stability
and Growth Pact might be optimal.
All of this means that adoption of the euro would
need to be postponed for some time after EU acces-
sion and ERM-II participation. But this is not nec-
essarily a bad thing for the new Member States.The
priority for economic policy in the accession coun-
tries must be to build upon their continued trans-
formation to a market-based economy so as to stim-
ulate a successful catching-up process.As described
above,there is only a limited chance to fulfil the cri-
teria for the changeover to the euro (Stage III)
which have been developed for economies in a
more advanced stage of development and integra-
tion. In the interim, the accession countries would
be expected to conduct their exchange rate policies
as a matter of common concern and – if appropriate
– to participate in ERM 2.
The institutional dimension: steps towards the
euro area
The choice of exchange-rate regime is primarily an
issue for the candidate countries themselves.
However, in the recent past it has also been a topic
of discussion inside the EU.7 Candidate countries
are in a specific situation because the debate over
exchange-rate regime choice is also a debate of the
prospects for adoption of the euro. By definition,
the enlargement of the Union also implies, at some
stage, a widening of the euro area. So the adoption
of the euro provides a “terminal point of the tra-
jectory” of the exchange rate strategies of the can-
didate countries.
Unambiguously, the EU Treaty provides for a clear
and unique institutional path towards the adoption
of the single currency for the candidate countries.
Upon accession, the new Member States will enter
the EU and participate in EMU with the status of
Member States with a derogation from adopting
the euro. New Member States will have to treat
their exchange rate policies as a matter of common
concern and are expected to join ERM-II at some
point after accession.Then, for the adoption of the
euro, the Treaty requires that new Member States
reach a high degree of sustainable nominal conver-
7 In November 2000 the ECOFIN Council issued a statement say-
ing that the EU does not impose any requirements on monetary
policy prior to accession. After accession, however, exchange rate
policy will be a matter of common concern.gence. This is the equal treatment principle, and it
will be applied in full to the candidate countries.
This path excludes the possibilities of either a reg-
ular adoption of the euro immediately upon acces-
sion, or the adoption of the euro before accession,
sometimes referred to as “euroisation”.
How does this relate to economic policy choices?
The key message here is that even in the countries
most advanced in transition, the reform agenda
relating to accession must have priority over policy
moves inspired by full EMU participation (Stage
III). Compliance with the Copenhagen criteria
takes precedence over compliance with nominal
convergence criteria, and therefore EMU partici-
pation, for at least two reasons. First, greater
progress towards real and structural convergence
should take place ahead of nominal convergence,
even though the two can be mutually supportive.
Second, only countries that are functioning market
economies capable of coping with competitive
pressures can be assessed for nominal conver-
gence; that is, the Maastricht criteria must be
applied to “comparable economies”.
At some stage after accession, candidate countries
are expected to formally participate in ERM 2.
ERM 2 is flexible enough to encompass different
regimes, provided that the countries’ commitments
and objectives are credible and in line with those
of the mechanism.The only clear incompatibilities
with ERM 2 that can already be identified at this
stage are fully floating exchange rates, crawling
pegs and pegs to anchors other than the euro.
In principle, the option of maintaining a euro-based
currency board until the adoption of the euro is avail-














must be a case-by-
case decision
al commitment to a greater degree of fixity against
the euro within an ERM 2 participation. However,
when a country with a currency board wants to join
ERM 2,the request would have to be examined in the
context of the common procedure set out in the
ERM 2 Resolution, and the central parity/conversion
rate would have to be agreed multilaterally. This
implies that some of the countries that prove able to
successfully operate a currency board vis-à-vis the
euro would not necessarily have to go through a “dou-
ble regime change” (moving away to some flexibility
before going back again to a harder peg and subse-
quently the irrevocable locking of the exchange rate).
Increased exchange-rate fixity in the run-up to
accession need not be,however,the preferred solu-
tion, or more the exception than the norm. For
example, with the flotation of the zloty before a
future participation in ERM 2, Poland clearly
opted for an approach which is consistent with the
acquis and which may accommodate capital
inflows more easily, provided that exchange rate
policy is adequately supported by fiscal policy.
Recently, Hungary also widened its exchange rate
band in order to allow for greater flexibility in the
exchange rates.
Generally speaking, in the run-up to accession and
participation in ERM 2, the candidate countries will
have to reconcile their ambitions for exchange rate
stability and inflation reduction. In this respect, many
candidate countries have already indicated, in the
context of the accession negotiations,that they intend
to join the mechanism only if they can sustain a peri-
od of participation without realignments so as to
qualify for the adoption of the euro within a minimum
period of two years.Whilst it is impossible at this stage
to assess whether such expectations are credible (and
these assessments will vary on a case-by-case basis),
some of the difficulties observed with the disinflation
process to low levels should inject caution in the can-
didate countries’ more ambitious exchange rate
strategies. In this area, the occurrence of inflation
rates exceeding those of the euro area is exactly what
economists would expect in a catching-up economy
(Balassa-Samuelson).The more ambitious timetables
would pre-suppose that inflation in the countries con-
cerned be very close to the level consistent with
avoiding significant downward deviations from the
chosen ERM 2 central parity upon entry.
Looking ahead, this is particularly important, in
view of the precedents for assessing the degree of
exchange rate stability against the euro, for the ful-
filment of the conditions for the adoption of the sin-
gle currency. Following the principle of equal treat-
ment, exchange rate stability for future Member
States will be judged against significant variations
from the narrow bands around the central parity,
and not against the wide standard bands.
Conclusions
Exchange rate policy or “regime choice” in transi-
tion and in the run-up to EMU is a difficult exer-
cise. It has to take into account several factors of
which five are the most important: (1) minimising
the cost of disinflation, (2) facilitating economic
growth and real convergence, (3) assisting adjust-
ment to real shocks and maintaining external bal-
ance, (4) containing exposure to reversible capital
flows while (5) preparing for entry into ERM 2
and,in due course,for the full adoption of the euro.
Because of the diversity of factors and potential
trade-offs, there is clearly a case for heterogeneity
of monetary and exchange-rate regimes between
now and accession,and possibly beyond,within the
framework of ERM 2. In a sense, the EU’s
approach to the enlargement process and to the
process of adopting the euro have much in com-
mon:they are both progressive and as much as pos-
sible realistic, with clearly-defined stages on the
road towards an irrevocable goal.
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